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INTRODUCTION
This essay deals with the responses by local urban areas along the northern part of
the Japan Sea coast of Honshu to the establishment of the Japanese puppet state of
Manchuria in 1932 and the subsequent potentials for trade.  Its focus is on how these
previously neglected areas of Japan saw Japanese imperialism as a catalyst for their
own development; how the images and discourses of future greatness spurred a form
of regional imperialism that was inwards-looking and commercial in nature, but which
also created support for the national-level external and militaristic expansionism amid
the local-level rhetoric of “Nihonkai Dakkyaku,” or “Escape from the Japan Sea.”
Against the background of central government deliberations concerning which
ports to assign first-ranked shipping lines to, and the desires of the industrial centers of
Kansai and the Pacific coast for cheap shipping, this paper examines how imperialism
was perceived by regions in terms of local rather than national or international
politics.  While much of the focus is on Kanazawa, the largest city on the Japan Sea
coast, attention is also paid to Toyama, whose 1937 expo was a direct response to the
development of Manchurian trade, and to Niigata, where the opening of the Jo¯etsu
line from Tokyo in 1931 provided an added catalyst for development.  Tsuruga,
whose proximity to the Kansai region spurred development, and Sakata, to the north,
a commercial center and trade port since the Edo period, will be briefly looked at as
well in order to provide some degree of universality.
Very little attention has been paid to the development of regional modern Japan in
the English-language historiography.1) One notable exception is Michael Lewis’s
study of Toyama, which focuses on the far from smooth relationship between Toyama
prefecture and the central government.  In particular, in chapter five, “Local
Imperialism and the Chimera of Progress,” he discusses the discourses regarding the
expansion of empire.  However, his primary focus there is on the rhetoric of the
Russo–Japanese War, and the ideology of the 1930s is secondary.  In addition, Lewis
mainly looks at the jingoistic media response, and does not inform us of the extent to
which such views were common among the local leaders.
Lewis’s focus on the region, however, is one of very few works that give it its due.
Particularly in the major historiography, by focusing on the dominant discourses of
formation of the Meiji state and the growth of imperialism, which portrays Japan as a
collective ideology, the role and importance of regional identity is overlooked.  Much
of the research regarding the region is designed to show the penetration and reach of
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central government policies, or contrast between the countryside and the city.  For
example, T. Fujitani, in Splendid Monarchy,2) refers to the various ways in which the
Imperial institution was perceived in regional areas such as Niigata, but does not
discuss the underlying reasons for such differences in perception in regional terms.
Fujitani instead refers to “folk ideas” as a catalyst for popular perception of the
imperial organ but does not elaborate on the significance of regional identity in
forming these ideas.
This contrast between national identity and “old localisms” is also addressed by
James Baxter in his study of Meiji Restoration Kanazawa.  However, while old
localisms may have been supplanted or over-ridden to some extent by the centrally-
based ideas of the nation-state, they nevertheless did not vanish entirely, but adapted
into new ones that drew their strength from memories of the old.  As Louise Young
notes, “It is easy to lose sight, in this larger picture, of the ways in which imperialism
also stimulated the growth of plural identities within the national fabric.” 3) While
Young acknowledges that “support for troops defending the empire was articulated
increasingly in local pride and loyalty, giving a distinctly local cast to the imagined
community of nation,” 4) detailing how local war heroes were feted by their home
regions, this is in fact used not to show the diversity of response but the homogeneity.
While she notes that at a “discursive level, the two fields [of national and local]
overlapped; the language of mobilization interwove appeals to region and nation,” 5)
her study on Japan’s reaction to Empire in the 1930s does in fact stop short of any
detailed examination of the role of local identity in the forging of Japan’s “Total
Empire.”  It is this lacuna that the present paper attempts to redress in a small way, by
focusing on the reactions of the major Japan Sea coast centers to the creation of
Manchuria and the potential it offered them, through trade and commerce, to thrive
and develop in the name of Empire.
The Effects of Japanese Imperialist Expansion on Local Rhetoric
In early 1932, the organisers of the Kanazawa City “Great Industry and Tourism
Expo” faced a serious problem.  The Shanghai Incident had erupted a few weeks
earlier, and among the first army units to be sent from Japan was the Kanazawa-based
Ninth Division.  The battles were tough, and the local newspapers were full of reports
from the front lines, carrying reports of war dead and causalities.  The mood of the
city was somber.  As Mayor Yoshikawa Ichitaro¯ noted, it was hardly the time to be
reading casualty reports in the morning paper and then seeing dancing girls at the
expo in the evening.6)
This essay therefore takes as one of its central themes the response of the expo
organisers to the significant military and imperialistic events of early 1932: the
Shanghai Incident of late January through March, and the formal founding of the
State of Manchukuo in early March.  Both events had a profound effect on Kanazawa,
located as it was on the Japan Sea coast directly opposite Manchuria, and desperate
for a way to overcome its “back of Japan” industrial backwardness.  Examining the
local responses to national policies, what Young has termed the “local cast to
imagined community of nation,” allows us to see exactly what these local identities
are, how they associated themselves with the concept of Empire, and how they both
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fed off and supplied Imperial ambitions in the 1930s.  The discourse surrounding the
Kanazawa Expo of spring 1932 gives us a very clear look at these ideas, happening as
it did directly after the events in Shanghai and Manchuria, in a city that saw itself as
intimately intertwined in their outcome, and moreover a city that had a very clear
historical consciousness of gradual decline and weakness since the Meiji era.
As Yoshimi Shun’ya notes,7) against the background of Imperialist expansion after
the Sino–Japanese and Russo–Japanese Wars, expos became devices to confirm the
Imperialist position of Japan with regard to its distance from the colonies.  As
Imperialistic rhetoric, expos were used as military propaganda devices to justify
Japan’s expansion into Asia.  The two principal events of Japanese Imperialism in
1932, the Shanghai Incident and the creation of Manchuria, had two very different
effects on the feelings of the population back home.  While the creation of Manchuria
was welcomed on several levels: as an outlet for Japanese population expansion, a
new trade market, a friendly neighbor in an increasingly unfriendly region; the
reaction to the fighting in Shanghai was almost uniformly militaristic in tone.  Stories
such as the “Three Human Bombs,” who were presented as having gallantly sacrificed
their lives to blow open an important gateway, were mythologized through the media,
treated as national heroes and their lives made into dramatic motion pictures seen
around the country.  One of the most gung-ho places was Kanazawa, home of the
Ninth Division of the army, who saw the bulk of the fighting.
The local media took a central role in spreading militarism in Japan, as has been
frequently noted by other researchers.  In Kanazawa, the two major newspapers
competed with each other in coverage of the events of the day, with the Minseito¯-
affiliated Hokuriku Mainichi focusing on the new nation of Manchuria, and the
Seiyu¯kai-connected Hokkoku Shinbun taking a more overtly militaristic stance.  The
Hokuriku Mainichi, influenced by the ideas of its first chairman, Nagai Ryu¯taro¯ (later
Minister of Colonization under the 1932 Saito¯ cabinet), preferred to champion the
cause of trade with the new nation of Manchuria as a panacea for Kanazawa and the
Hokuriku region’s ills.  In contrast, the Hokkoku Shinbun’s favourite catch-cry was
“Gunkoku no Haru,” or the “Military Country Spring.”  The Hokkoku Shinbun even went
so far as to directly petition the city government to change the name of the expo from
“Industry and Tourism” to “Industry and Military.”  While this option was rejected,
the media adopted militarism as an unofficial third theme of the expo, and the bulk of
its reporting was focused on the militaristic and imperialistic themes of the expo.
Local expos were a common event in the Japan of the late 1920s.  Many of them
were themed around remembering the Taisho period, or commemorating the
coronation of the new Emperor Showa.  As the effects of the Depression deepened,
their role as stimulators of local industry and economy were also emphasized, and it
was against this background of economic boosterism that Kanazawa City decided to
hold an expo as well.  In addition, to take advantage of the growing tourism industry
and to promote itself as an industrial center, for the first time “Tourism” would be a
second theme of a regional expo.  However, the events of early 1932 added a third,
unofficial theme: Empire.
And nowhere was this new theme more clearly visible than in the enlarged
Defence Pavilion.  Designed originally to exhibit the latest in scientific warfare
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technology, the focus of the exhibits changed radically after the Shanghai Incident
brought the realities of wartime sacrifice to the local populace.  Now it was the heroic
deaths of locals that were brought to the forefront, with the prime exhibits being
scenarios of the deaths of Major Hayashi and Majo Kuga.  Kuga in particular, though
originally from Saga Prefecture, was lionized as a local—and indeed, as a national—
hero, with no fewer than seven films made about his suicide.  For Kuga did not die in
battle.  He was captured by the Chinese, while unconscious, and released after the
end of hostilities.  Then he went to the scene of his capture, drew out his pistol, and
shot himself, in one of the defining acts of modern Japanese militarism.8)
The personal effects of dead soldiers of Kanazawa, such as Kuga’s blood-stained
Will addressed to his father, were purposely exhibited in order to bring forth “tears of
remembrance,” and “create in the people a sense of patriotism and loyalty” 9) through
the somber display.  This emphasis on the personal over the general, the regional over
the national, created a propaganda space in which local regional feelings were co-
opted into deepening national patriotism, and through these created links of local and
national loyalty, thus bringing the popular consciousness into line with the Army’s
ambitions.10)
The other significant change to the design of the expo was the enrichment of the
Manchuria–Mongolia Pavilion.11) The Manchuria Pavilion was the joint operation of
the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Guangdong Bureau, two
organizations that were very keen indeed to spur Japanese interest in the continent.
However, what is interesting about the media rhetoric concerning the Manchuria
Pavilion is that, while undoubtedly Imperialist in tone in that it saw Manchuria as a
resource to be used, it was almost entirely free of overtly militaristic tones.  This was
in stark contrast to the Defence Pavilion rhetoric, which was highly militaristic, but
less concerned with pure Imperialist ideas of land and resources.  The expansionist,
imperialist rhetoric of the Japan Sea region towards Manchuria was largely peaceful in
nature, an extension of the ideas of the Taisho Democracy period.
The role of the media in creating an idealized vision of the city’s future was strongly
linked to rhetoric concerning imperialism.  As the region’s leading newspaper, the
Hokkoku Shinbun remarked, “If after the prosperity of the West we can look forward to
the prosperity of the East, particularly Japan, then Manchuria must be the field in
which the Japanese people flourish.” 12) Thus Manchuria’s development, in the words
of a Hokkoku Shinbun editorial, was “to be determined by the effort of the Japanese
people (this is probably not something that should be made public knowledge
internationally) …  The development of Manchuria is a guarantee of the prosperity of
the Hokuriku region …  Whether for industry or tourism, the future international
attitude towards Manchuria is vital for the Hokuriku …  This is the reason why the
Tourism and Industry Expo will succeed.” 13) The imperialistic jingoism of the media
is obvious, as is the linking through regionalism with the expo, the media recreating
the expo as a propaganda device for regional views of imperialism.
Manchuria, in the words of the Hokkoku Shinbun, was the land of infinite riches
which Hokuriku people were destined to open up.  For this reason, the Manchuria
Pavilion was designed to show “correct concepts of Manchuria, and the rightness of
our lengthening national path”14) into the land.  To that end, The Manchuria Pavilion,
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the focus of most attention out of the colonial pavilions, was largely given over to
displays of soy production, building products, hops, salt, glass, cloths, and a lump of
coal one and half metres tall.  In addition, panoramas and models laid out before the
visitors the precise nature of the new Japan Sea Era, with relief maps showing
Manchuria and Japan and trade routes and ports shown in lights.  The Hokkoku
Shinbun referred to Manchuria as “the world’s treasure-house” and “the lifeline of our
nation,” referencing the phrase of Matsuoka Yo¯suke that Manchuria was economically
and militarily Japan’s bulwark against Soviet and Western—and Chinese—
aggression.15)
Manchuria was “waiting for the bold expansion of our northern [Hokuriku region]
people” who would “develop its endless riches,”16) and the Manchuria Pavilion was
designed to ensure just that.  It was an unashamedly commercial operation—a
gigantic advertising booth for empire.  As the Hokkoku Shinbun noted, “The
encouragement of industry is, along with the strengthening of defensive capabilities,
one of the two great wellsprings of national prosperity.” 17) Thus the local ambitions
for economic development were clothed in the more noble rhetoric of patriotism, and
the establishment of trade ties with Manchuria was seen as a patriotic act as well as a
boon to local commerce.  Empire, for the Hokuriku region, was all about economics
and trade.
The reason for this was, above all, Kanazawa’s location at the center of the Japan
Sea coast and its rank as the most populous city there.  To emphasize this, an editorial
from the Hokkoku Shinbun invoked Mencius’ ideas of location, people, and timing as
the fundamentals to national prosperity: “According to Mencius, there are three
things that make a country great: usefulness of location, harmony of the people, and
the timing of heaven.  …  As far as place goes, in terms of Mencius’ usefulness of
location, Kanazawa is a large city facing the Japan Sea most closely connected to
Manchuria, so is blessed with a useful location.  The harmony of her people is also
shown in the way her citizens have come together to make this expo a success.” 18)
Thus in addition to the “timing” of the creation of Manchukuo, the success of the
expo was proof of the “hito no wa” (harmony of people).  And, of course, the “chi no
ri ” (location) as the closest city to Manchuria gave Kanazawa opinion leaders reason
to hope that they could finally break free of the lag in modernization they had
suffered since the Meiji period.
Port and Trade Opportunities on the Japan Sea Coast
The most notable response to the formation of Manchuria among the Japan Sea
coast cities was the idea that this would put an end to their isolation and lack of
modern development.  In order to examine these ideas more closely, the discourses
surrounding the presentation of Manchuria and Empire in the 1932 Kanazawa City
Great Industry and Tourism Expo, which opened the month after Manchuria was
officially declared an independent nation, provide a particularly clear example of how
localisms were both influenced by and in turn influenced the ideology of the greater
nation-state, providing an “imagined community” not only of nation but of region,
and emphasizing the importance of the region within the nation.
Ideas about creating a Japan Sea-based trading bloc had been fermenting since the
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turn of the century, and notably after the Russo–Japanese War focused everyone’s
attention on the Japan Sea and the proximity of the continent.  However serious local
debate on the subject—as opposed to overly jingoistic journalism—had to wait until
it was made practical by the formation of Manchuria, and, notably, the opening up of
the Jilin–Hoeryo˘ng line ( Jilin in Manchuria to Hoeryo˘ng in Korea), connecting the
capital of Xinjiang with the port of Najin on the northern Korean coast.  This would
enable goods to be shipped directly to Japan Sea ports rather than being taken down
to Dairen on the Guangdong Peninsula and shipped via Shimonoseki to Kobe.  As
noted by several city councillors at the end of 1932, the opening of the Jilin–
Hoeryo˘ng line promised the rapid development of trade with the far shore, and
Kanazawa, as the closest city, would grow dramatically as the center of
Japan–Manchuria trade.  In fact, as one councillor put it, Kanazawa Port would
become the “lifeline” (seimeisen) of Kanazawa in the same way that Manchuria was the
lifeline of Japan.  In this way, local ambitions were linked with national goals in the
form of an Imperialistic Regionalism that was to drive much of the Japan Sea
prefectures in their quest for parity with the Pacific coast.
The debates in Toyama showed similar ambitions to become a trading port and
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Figure 1: Major Japan Sea Era trade routes, late 1930s.
industrial center, and in fact—helped in part by its cheap hydroelectric power—
Toyama succeeded where Kanazawa did not.  However, its ambitions were fueled not
by memories of past glories, but of past repression: it had been a satellite domain of
the Maeda for most of the Edo period, and so in the Meiji era, when rule from
Kanazawa was replaced with rule from Tokyo, there was little fundamental change in
position.19) Kawagoe, another former castle town near Tokyo, suffered similar decline
to Kanazawa in the early modern period.  Despite the promotion of traditional
industry and efforts by such groups as the Seinenkai to revitalize the city, Kawagoe
ended up having to depend on its position as part of the Greater Tokyo industrial
sphere.20) Mito, on the Pacific coast north of Tokyo and the second-largest castle town
in the Kanto region, like many regional centers of the time, was also acutely aware of
its position, both potential and actual.  “Inter-Urban Rivalry” (toshi-kan kyo¯so¯) was
common among regional centers, and was a very important spur for development.  In
Mito’s case, its potential for industrialization was severely curtailed when the
government monopolized the tobacco industry, one of its former traditional
industries.21)
The relationship between Manchuria and the Hokuriku was seen as vital to a new
dawn for the region.  Thus on the day of nominal Manchurian independence, March
1, the Hokkoku Shinbun was able to say that “our region, long robbed of the speed of
development isolated on the north, is now changed by fate, tasting a rebirth of glory
shining in the new sunlight.” 22) This was emphasized in the expo by the frequent use
of panoramas and dioramas, showing Manchuria and the Japan Sea spread out
beneath the visitors as a panoptic presentation of imperial power.  The sociologist
Yoshimi Shun’ya has linked the use of panoramas in expos with the idea of the
Foucauldian “gaze” of power, in which, like a panopticon, the viewer sees all, and by
seeing all is placed in a position of power.23) When the objects so viewed are
representative of a conquered empire, the significance of the panorama as a
representation of imperial power becomes apparent.  For the Kanazawa Expo, the use
of panoramas also reinforced the intimate geographical connection between the
Hokuriku and Manchuria, with models of the Japan Sea with potential trade routes
shown in red neon, providing a clear visual reminder of the key themes of the
Manchuria discourse: Empire meant prosperity and glory for the region.
The next question to consider, however, is to what extent this message was
received by the people of Kanazawa.  To do that, and put the local into a more
regional context, we need to look at the development of Japan Sea Era ideas over the
rest of the 1930s.  Without a port, no amount of hype and propaganda would work.
Thus the link between port development and the arrival of new industry was in fact
the prime motivation behind the development of Japan Sea Era ideas.  An
examination of the goals of the major centers of the Hokuriku reveals a common
denominator: the creation of a new trade route would lead Pacific coast industry to
relocate along the Japan Sea coast in order to take advantage of the new markets in
the continent.  Each city competed to be granted the status of Designated
Government Shipping Line.
On the Korean side, matters were simple.  Najin, promoted heavily by Ishihara
Kanji ,24) was to be the principal port, with Ch’o˘ngjin and U˘nggi as secondary ports.  It
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was also a way to avoid dependence on the Soviet port of Vladivostok, by completing
the line from the capital of Manchuria south through Korea.  The strategic value of
Najin had been recognised since the Russo–Japanese War, but serious port-building
did not begin until April 1933, a five-year plan with a budget of over twenty-five
million yen.  However, the effects of the new port and in particular the opening of the
Jilin–Hoeryo˘ng line25) had a profound effect on the discourses of identity along the
Japan Sea coast cities.
The excitement about the forthcoming “Japan Sea Era” was by no means limited to
the regions facing the continent.  For example a fourteen-part series in the Osaka
Mainichi Shinbun in November 1933 attests to the interest shown in the Pacific belt,
and listed the hoped-for benefits of developing ports along the Japan Sea coast.  The
first and foremost of these was the distance.  From the capital of Manchuria, Xinjiang,
to Tokyo via Tsuruga was only 2,111 km as opposed to 2,887 km via Pusan, and
2,961 km via Dairen.  The main ports of the Japan Sea coast were listed as, from west
to east, Sakai (Shimane), Miyatsu, Maizuru (Kyoto), Obama, Tsuruga (Fukui), Nanao
(Ishikawa), Fushiki (Toyama), Niigata (Niigata), Sakata (Yamagata), Tsuchizaki,
Funakawa, and Noshiro (Akita), for a total of twelve ports in all considered suitable
for developing for the Manchurian trade.  However, the series lamented that even
Niigata, its merits “recognized even by foreigners for one of the five great ports [treaty
ports] of Meiji, is now decayed to little more than a regional port” due to the way
Tokyo was developed as the political capital and Osaka as the commercial capital,
and the way the transport corridors and railroads developed between the two.
But just as changes in the transport network had spelled the doom of Niigata and
the other ports of the Japan Sea, so further changes could restore them.  The new
“Japan–Manchuria Block” would level out the discrepancies in industrial
development between Omote and Ura, the “front” Pacific coast and “near” Japan Sea
coast, the existence of which was even a concern among the major cities.  Thus the
image of Hokuriku as seen from the major cities was much the same as its own self-
identity.  The Osaka Mainichi series describes it as “in contrast to the bright and
energetic front of Japan (Omote Nihon), the Japan Sea coast, which used to be as
conservative and depressed as the impression gained from the term “Back of Japan”
(Ura Nihon), is looking forward to the glorious plans to build the three ports, and has
suddenly begun lively activity and we can hear a powerful tune from the wind and
waves of the Japan Sea in harmony with this.” 26)
Each city along the coast was eager for development, not least because of the
windfall of central government money that designation as a government shipping
route would bring. 27) From the 1920s the rivalry between the port cities grew intense,
particularly between Tsuruga, nearest to Osaka and Kobe, and Niigata, which with
the opening of the Jo¯etsu line in 1931, was now on the direct route between the
continent and Tokyo.  As Yoshii Kenichi has shown, much of the rivalry was driven
by the competition between the various private shipping companies, notably the
Tsuruga-based Kita-Nippon Steamship Line, which was one of the first groups to
popularize the phrase “Nihonkai Jidai ” ( Japan Sea Era).28) Almost every single city
along the Japan Sea coast of Honshu sent representations to Tokyo to try and extract
money from the central government.  However, it was clear that not all cities and
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ports were equal, and in fact the necessity for a major port on the Japan Sea coast
itself was a matter of much debate.  In the end Tsuruga, because of its proximity to
Osaka and the natural advantages of its harbor, was chosen as the primary
government-designated route, with Fushiki in Toyama prefecture and Niigata being
chosen as supplementary routes.  Niigata immediately protested this, and was
eventually allowed to join Fushiki as a supplementary port.
There was still powerful opposition, from the Ministry of Finance among others, to
the idea of spending large sums of money on ports on the other side of Japan.  One of
the most enthusiastic proponents, on the other hand, was the military, who had long
had their eye on the Japan Sea coast as the shortest route to ship men and materials to
potential war zones in northeast Asia.  Ishihara Kanji, who was backing the
development of Najin for just that reason, was, along with War Minister Araki Tadao,
eager to support development of Japan Sea ports, but in 1933 the military was not yet
powerful enough to ignore the politicians.  However, calls for the national defence
were a sure-fire way of arm-twisting, along with dark warnings from the Minister of
the Interior about the potential for civil unrest in the Japan Sea regions if nothing was
done.  So a compromise was agreed on: the three ports previously designated as
government shipping lines—Tsuruga the main part, with Fushiki and Niigata as
secondary—would continue to be developed with central government assistance, but
nothing extra would be done.  However, in 1938 the situation changed again, with the
central government designating the Tokyo–Niigata–Najin–Xinjiang route as the main
one, with the southern route through Osaka as the secondary route.  However, the
Niigata route was primarily used for shipping migrants to Manchuria, and Osaka was
still the main trade port.  Therefore, even the designation of Niigata as a central
shipping port had little impact on its development, serving as it did simply as a
staging-post for emigration.  Even at its peak, trade along the Japan Sea coast was a
tiny fraction of all Japan–Continent trade, and in the end ports like Niigata found their
main use in shipping colonists and soldiers to Manchuria rather than importing raw
materials for use in local factories.
Historical Consciousness and Urban Development
Nevertheless, excitement about the new Japan Sea Era continued unabated among
the Japan Sea coast cities.  And it is this excitement, rather than the realities of
government-regulated commerce, that gives us an insight into how the region viewed
itself among the growing empire, particulary in its quest for “Ura-Nihon dakkyaku”
(literally “Escape from the Back of Japan”), a movement that was dedicated to
removing the stigma of being known as the back side to Japan.  Central to this was the
development of Manchuria and the “Nihonkai kosui-ka ron” ( Japan Sea Lake Theory),
whereby the Japan Sea became in essence an ‘inland sea’ of the Japanese Empire.
This was a very popular idea among the Japan Sea coast regions, and was the basic
driving force behind much of regional consciousness at the time.  It was primarily
expressed as a desire to attract industry, which would give a boost to the economy
and population of the Ura Nihon regions.  How each region expressed its desire for
growth, however, was closely related to its historical consciousness, and often
expressed in terms of local pride: not just the desire to grow, but the feeling that such
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growth was a natural offshoot of its history and culture.
The Mayor of Niigata, for example, hearkened back to the days when its port was
designated one of the five foreign trade Treaty Ports back in 1868,29) emphasizing its
traditional roots as a gateway to overseas trade.  Writing in a thick 1939 compilation
of essays about the importance and benefits of the Japan Sea economy,30) he noted
that Niigata was “already very prosperous, an industrial city centered around its port”
back in the Eiroku period (1558–1570).  This hearkening back to Niigata’s
commercial prosperity was echoed by the Governor of Niigata, who noted the port
dated back a thousand years as a shipping port for Echigo rice and in its heyday in the
Edo period it had “three thousand ships a day.”  The choice of Niigata as one of the
five Treaty Ports was also a sign of “recognition by the realm.”  However, as the
Governor made clear, what the city and region was really after was industry.  He
noted that “Niigata, bathed in the light of the era” was “worthy of a careful look as the
center for Japan Sea trade, with its plans for a population of a million, its application
of urban planning, its rapid growth as an industrial town, as well as its promotion of
export industries and luring of factories.” 31) Industry was key to growth, transport was
key to industry, and the growing Empire in Asia was a catalyst that would bring
maritime trade and transport back to the Japan Sea.
Similar ambitions were expressed in most of the major cities of the Japan Sea coast.
Sakata, for example, was long a major trading port for the kitamae traders that plied
the Japan Sea in the Edo period.  Its wealthy merchants, led by the rich Honma
family, gave it a very different flavor to the military castle town of Tsuruoka nearby.
At the mouth of the Mogami River, it was a central dispersal point for almost all trade
in the region.  In the Meiji period it thrived on the sardine trade, but the coming of
the railroad, like in many Japan Sea port cities, had a drastic effect on its prosperity.
Now goods flowed the other way, via rail to the Pacific coast.  Sakata port became
largely devoted to importing coal, salt, and other raw products for the prefectural
hinterland, and exporting the local rice crop.  By the end of the 1930s, however,
Sakata’s port was largely used for shipping colonists to Manchuria, drawing on the
ready supply of impoverished Tohoku farmers.  This was claimed by the mayor as a
positive thing, but while shipping migrants out may have brought government
subsidies, these did not directly affect the region’s prosperity.  Sakata’s visions were of
becoming a large industrial city, based on its cheap labour—it was especially well
provided with the “female workers needed in light industry.” 32) In Sakata’s case,
central government imperialist policies overwhelmed its personal desires for
development.  But the pattern is seen elsewhere along the Japan Sea coast, in other
cities that had more luck.
One such city was Toyama, which hoped to use its cheap hydro power (and cheap
workers) as a main lure for industry.  Connected with the development of Higashi-
Iwase (near Toyama city) port and Fushiki (near Takaoka city) port, it was eager to act
as a gateway to the riches of Manchuria, which would be shipped to Toyama,
processed using Toyama’s cheap electricity, and then distributed around Japan.
Toyama’s visions of greatness through empire began in the 1890s, with the build-up to
the Sino–Japanese War, as well as the predicted opening of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad.  However, despite the efforts of people like Fujii No¯zo¯, whose 1891 “Fushiki
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Chikko¯-ron” argued that Fushiki was perfectly placed to trade with Europe via
Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian,33) at this early stage it was largely the province of
over-enthusiastic journalists trumpeting local patriotism.  This was also, as Lewis has
suggested,34) a way to attack the central government’s lack of attention to the region.
However the tone is modified after the Unification with Korea, to accommodate a
more commercial viewpoint.  As the Prefectural Governor, Hamada Tsunenosuke,
noted in 1913, the Japan Sea was now ripe for making into Japan’s “Garden.”  Amidst
the WWI boom, and the Siberian Expedition of 1918, the focus was on setting up
shipping links between Toyama and the continent, notably Vladivostok and northern
Korea.35) The Hokuriku Steamship Line was set up in 1920, with twice-weekly runs to
the U.S.S.R. and Korea from Fushiki and Nanao, the latter in Ishikawa prefecture.
After the formation of Manchuria, interest in the possibilities of trans-Japan Sea trade
peaked once again, with the sending of delegations of business and political leaders
across on fact-finding missions.  This interest reached its zenith with the 1936 Japan–
Manchuria Great Industrial Exposition, dedicated to the concepts of trans-maritime
trade and prosperity, and the benefits to the local region through such.
Fukui prefecture also shared the same vision.  The Mayor of Tsuruga, the principal
port in the prefecture, made an impassioned plea to patriotism when he linked the
“peaking wave crest of our fortunes based on the great founding spirit of our nation
advancing into the continent thanks to the power of the Imperial Army” to a shift in
national focus from the Pacific to the Japan Sea coasts.  Tsuruga, called “the best port
on the Japan Sea coast” in Fukumoto Nichinan’s Kaikoku Seidan36) in the late
nineteenth century, was long one of the main ports on the coast, and its proximity to
Kansai, together with its natural harbor, made it a natural place to develop one of the
major ports on the Japan Sea coast.  The city of Fukui too made much of its
industrialization and suitability as a regional center, but aside from a rather remote
port of Nanao on the Noto Peninsula, Ishikawa prefecture in general and Kanazawa
city in particular were largely silent.  Kanazawa Port was never completed, and the
city’s dreams of becoming the Kobe of the Japan Sea coast never materialized.
One factor that was blamed at the time was the attitude of the locals.  The year after
the Kanazawa Expo, in 1933, the chief writer of the Hokkoku Shinbun, Kamoi Haruka,
noted that Awagasaki, near the port of Kanazawa, would one day have tall buildings
standing on the dunes “like Manhattan in New York.”  It is a representative example
of the confidence that the civic leaders expressed regarding Kanazawa’s future.
However, as Kamoi noted in the Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce monthly in 1935,
the problem still remained the “happy-go-lucky” (hiyorimi-shugi) ideas of the
“conservative” populace, who refused to be stimulated by the examples of Tokyo and
Osaka industrial growth.  Like skyscrapers built on sand, the dreams of prosperity
failed to become a reality.  Despite hope from the various mayors and other civic
leaders, Kanazawa had, as it were, missed the boat as regards the development of
overseas trade.
Despite this, as Kanazawa’s decline became more and more acute, the concept of a
“Showa Hyakumangoku” and of a “Japan Sea Era” that would lift Kanazawa back into
prominence became increasingly important facets of regional rhetoric.  The
Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce was one of the main promoters of trans-Japan Sea
141
trade, setting up a consultation center37) and running frequent articles in the
“Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce Monthly” designed to assist potential merchants
in dealing with the continentals.  For example, on several occasions they published
articles detailing the likes and dislikes of Manchurians in terms of colors, numbers,
designs, and so forth.38) However, without a decent port and the ability to attract
industry, these ambitions would go nowhere.  Thus Kanazawa’s social construct of
Empire was focused increasingly on creating opportunities at home in order to take
advantage of opportunities abroad.  As Kanazawa’s decline became more and more
an issue, the ideas of the “Showa Hyakumangoku” 39) and of a “Japan Sea Era” that
would lift Kanazawa back into prominence were important facets of regional rhetoric.
These issues were taken seriously at the highest levels in Kanazawa politics.  In the
1935 budget explanation plan, Kanazawa city councillor Kagaya Gengo pointed out
that:
Development of the Pacific coast cities has reached its limit, but with the formation
of the country of Manchuria and the development of the Japan Sea Era …
Kanazawa is the center of this Japan Sea Era, one of the main cities on the Japan
Sea coast …  Greater Kanazawa cannot develop as a city without its door facing the
Japan Sea.  What is more, Japan is running out of places to develop …  If you were
to ask where must we look for to find the Japanese Empire’s development, [the
answer is] in Manchuria, the Manchuria that we as a nation have poured our lives
and our resources into, and the closest city to that Manchuria and its vast natural
resources of northern Manchuria is Kanazawa.40)
Kanazawa mayor Kataoka Yasushi later noted in 1935 that “the new trade routes
opening now with Korea and Manchuria along the Japan Sea coast [… mean …] the
former capital of the million [koku] fief Kanazawa is now overflowing with energy and
vitality, and poised to dominate the Japan Sea Era as a new city … its future as an
industrial city is now assured.” 41) The new Kanazawa to be created, the “Showa no
Hyakumangoku,” as the local edition of the Osaka Asahi Shinbun put it,42) was to be the
“capital” of the Japan Sea coast region.  As Kataoka said in 1936, “The directions in
Manchurian and Korean development and the expansion of cities through the natural
trends in recent economic society are creating an unprecedented stimulation of this
city and its environs.” 43)
In 1935 and 1936, when amalgamation of neighboring towns and villages gave
Kanazawa both open land to expand industry onto, and a port, the Hokuriku Mainichi
Shinbun proclaimed “the restoration in name and fact (meijitsu tomo) of the million
[koku] fief” and cast the city’s growth in a distinctly military light by noting “in this
moment of national emergency, when citizens are on edge, the people of Kaga, proud
of their million [koku] fief ancestors, are standing at the vanguard of the great spirit of
amalgamation and harmony ready to continue to progress strongly towards the
building of a great city, which is not only the result of the depth of public-spiritedness
but is also the [sound of ] bold martial trumpets marching towards the realisation of a
new life and co-prosperity.” 44)
Hope for a bright new future was also to be found among the children.  When the
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port-town of Kanaiwa was integrated into Kanazawa city, the Hokkoku Shinbun ran a
series of quotes from local schoolchildren.45) While the editors would have been
selective in their choices, the comments are still indicative not only of the degree of
penetration of the current ideas, but their dissemination methods.  As one boy stated,
“According to the newspapers and people, Kanazawa is going to develop into a
commercial and industrial city dealing with Manchuria.”  Another comment said that
“Yokohama and Kobe were once poor fishing villages.  When we become Greater
Kanazawa I think we will greatly help the development of our Great Japan and trade
with Manchuria and other foreign countries as a great trade port on the Japan Sea.”
However this ambition, while strong among the civic leaders and the children, was
rather more lacking among the people who most needed it—the merchants of
Kanazawa.  Long accustomed to regular patronage from the samurai class under the
Maeda, the merchants of Kanazawa were slow to embrace modern Westernised ways
of commerce.  Department stores were rare, and seen more as exhibitions of modern
lifestyle or places to escape the gloomy everyday world than serious shopping
venues.46) The Chamber of Commerce gave frequent workshops and seminars on
how to arrange window displays, how to use the new neon signs, how to light up shop
interiors, but despite their efforts, it was hard to find a modern-style shop where
customers would browse and select at leisure.47) The miserly, xenophobic attitude of
shopkeepers and merchants was also criticised: they were considered to be concerned
only with short-term gain rather than long-term profit, and would cheat any non-local
visitors—a definite public-relations problem at the time of the expo.  This was an
issue that was frequently discussed by the civic leaders, the richest businessmen, and
the editorials of the major local newspapers.  Termed the “hyakumangoku-kibun,” or
“million-koku feeling,” in a direct reference to the city’s former wealth and stability, it
was considered to be the main stumbling block to Kanazawa’s rebirth.  One
particularly vocal critic was Monda Hide, the director of the Kanazawa Cottonflower
Spinning Factory.  While he praised the warmth and quality of the people, he also
lamented that “this hyakumangoku feeling is what is holding Kanazawa back.  As one
who loves this city, I must reluctantly point out that people here are far too
disinterested in industrial or commercial or artistic endeavors.” 48) One of the solutions
attempted was an appeal to patriotism and nationalism, wrapped up in local pride and
ambition.
In a series of essays written for the Kanazawa Chamber of Commerce in 1927,49)
members of the urban elite, in discussing ways to energize the city, decried what they
termed the conservative, apathetic “hyakumangoku feelings” of the general populace.
In the call for papers, we can see that there was a great deal of concern that Kanazawa
be the “capital” of the Hokuriku in fact as well as name.  However, as they noted,
“The idea that we could compare ourselves to Nagoya is already just a dream.”  In
fact, Kanazawa was being overtaken by upstart “newly-developed fishing villages.”
A professor at the Fourth Higher School blamed “the veneration of the feudal
government” and said that this feeling “must be done away with ere any decent
progress be made: drunk on past glories (hyakumangoku kibun), lacking stimulation
added to this the strongly conservative, hidebound views of today, and we find that
although once we were seventh or eighth in national ranking, we are now thirteenth
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and show no signs of slowing; soon we may reach twentieth or even lower.”  The
decline of Kanazawa was thus perceived by the urban elite as exacerbated by its
people’s character, derided at the time as overly reliant on others and lacking self-
motivation: factors stemming from its wealth and security during the Edo period.  The
creation of grand projects, such as the expo, or urban planning, or trade with
Manchuria, was seen as a spur that would stimulate the local population, in the same
way as the construction of Heian-kyo¯.
Thus the historical consciousness of Kanazawa was both a weakness and a strength
when it came to urban development.  However, in other cities that did not share
Kanazawa’s sense of decline, it was put to better use.  Unlike Kanazawa, the historical
consciousness of Niigata and Toyama was in both cases a positive one.  Niigata’s
hearkening back to its early designation as an international trade port, and Toyama’s
long desire to assert its independence from its larger neighbor Kanazawa meant that
for both cities change and industrialization faced less resistance from a populace
feeling that things were better in the “good old days.”  Unlike Kanazawa, Toyama
succeeded in transforming itself into an industrial city and port.  For that reason, it
may be of interest to look briefly at the visions of Empire, and in particular
Manchuria, as revealed in the 1936 Toyama City Japan–Manchuria Great Industrial
Exposition.
The View from Toyama, 1936
As a further staging-post to the period of growing imperialism, an examination of
the discourses and representations of Manchuria and the local region in the Nichi-Man
Dai Sangyo¯ Hakurankai 50) provides an interesting way to compare and contrast ideas of
the same region with those of the earlier Kanazawa expo.  The Toyama expo, as can
be seen from its name, made the trade connection between Hokuriku and the
continent a central focus from the very start.  The recent opening of the Takayama
line from Toyama to Nagoya meant that Toyama was now able to position itself as the
Japan Sea gateway for the To¯kai region, as well as having good links to both Tokyo
and Osaka.
Held for fifty-five days, from the 15th of April to the 8th of June 1936, the expo was
designed to show off the modern city of Toyama to potential investors.  In that respect
it was similar to Kanazawa’s expo, held as it was after the completion of major
infrastructure (although in Toyama’s case this included the modern port of Higashi-
Iwase and the Toyama Airfield).  However, the expo site itself was also intended as a
showcase of modern town planning.  Sited on land reclaimed from the Jinzu¯ River, it
was designed to become part of the modern cityscape after the expo closed.51) The site
itself was part of the city’s desire to present itself as the central city of the Japan Sea
coast.
The mayor’s comments, broadcast on the radio as part of the expo publicity, reflect
the ambition behind the expo.
Now that the public safety of Manchuria is assured, and public order is being
established by the people and the government, the development of northern and
eastern Manchuria is being promoted, and the building of the port of Najin in
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northern Korea, as well as the important ports of Ch’o˘ngjin and U˘nggi, have been
called at last to their crucial role, the Sea of Japan is now but a lake, and the
opposite coast from Hokuriku has become the closest point of contact, we can look
forward to the arrival of the so-called Sea of Japan Era through our Empire’s trade
and industry.  Thus our Hokuriku region is now truly the front door of the Empire,
and moreover Toyama prefecture stands in the center of Hokuriku, and possesses
the superlatively good ports of Fushiki and Higashi-Iwase.52)
Here he clearly notes the close relationship between imperialism and local growth,
and his use of the phrase “front door” (omote genkan) shows the hope that the backward
and ignored Ura Nihon would be able to develop into another Omote.  In connection
with other calls to rename the region “Uchi Nihon,” or “inner Japan” the stigma
attached to the common name for the region was of serious concern to its residents.
Rhetoric common to regional promotion of the Japan Sea coast is also found in the
many speeches at the opening and closing ceremonies: developing city, industry,
transport infrastructure, and its closeness to Manchuria.  This emphasis on transport
suggests that its lack, rather than any other factors, was seen as the principal factor
behind the region’s lack of development: most rhetoric concerning the Hokuriku
region’s geographic position emphasized its isolation.  Another common phrase of
political rhetoric at the time was variations on the “kyokoku icchi” (together as one for
the nation) theme of national unity, often as “together as one for the city” or
prefecture.  This type of adaptation of popular phrases is seen in many major civic
projects that required some form of effort or sacrifice from the citizens.  In Kanazawa
it was used to smooth the municipal amalgamation of late 1935 and early 1936; in
Toyama at the same time it was used to smooth over Takaoka citizens’ objections to
the expo being held in Toyama city.
According to the official record of the expo, its main results were its “very
significant contribution to Japan–Manchuria friendship” through its displays of
Japanese and Manchurian industry, and its “great improvement of city scenery and
facilities and its promotion of urban planning.” 53) Thus it killed two birds with one
stone: improving local conditions by using the rhetoric of imperialism.  Indeed, the
“industry” aspect was in some ways an after-thought.  While the official record states
that no one is actually sure where the name came from, it was clear that the original
impetus had been to celebrate transport ties and friendship with Manchuria, and these
were most suitably expressed as industry.
For Manchuria was the central focus of the expo, in a very literal sense.  One of the
two Manchuria pavilions, the Japan—Manchuria Commemoration Pavilion,54) was
built astride the main boulevard, so that visitors entering from the front gate and
proceeding to the main hall passed under and through its arches.  Designed to be
bigger than any previous Manchuria pavilion, the main Manchuria Pavilion cost over
¥60,000 and was more than twice the size of the Kanazawa one, at nearly 550 m2,
and, like almost all “ethnic” pavilions of the time, done up in faux-native style.  Girls
in Manchurian costume served as guides, and the office upstairs was ready to take all
questions about Manchurian trade opportunities.  The pavilion was also, like the
Kanazawa one, sponsored by the Guangdong Bureau and the South Manchurian
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Railroad, this time with the added support of the Manchurian government.
Inside, a large panoramic model of Manchuria showed the location of cities,
transport, and resources—iron, coal, soy, and pasture land—laid out before the
visitors like a banquet.  This is typical of the way Manchuria was presented in the
1930s, but what is of interest about the exhibits inside is the greater focus on
Manchuria as an outlet for Japanese emigration rather than pure trade, in line with the
increasing central government emphasis on migration.  One notable exhibit featured a
display of life-size figures of children from all five races55) that were supposed to make
up Manchuria who showed, in the words of the official record, a “bright and happy
setting that paints a lovely scene of boys and girls playing together in peaceful racial
harmony … the children of Manchuria, living in complete equality and peace are …
daily building a paradise,” 56) a display of pure propaganda that would perhaps affect
even the most cynical.  Whatever Japan’s real intentions towards its puppet state, it
was essential that the relationship be portrayed as peaceful and honorable in order to
lure Japanese colonists.  The presentation of Manchuria as a land of riches, with
modern cities—one exhibit was a diorama of the new capital, with its Stage One
Urban Planning project just complete, showing how modern and developed it was—
where Japanese could find a new life in creating the Kingly Road Paradise (O¯do¯
Rakudo¯).
Unlike the Kanazawa Expo’s Manchuria Pavilion, which was hastily augmented
after the creation of the new nation, Toyama’s was able to be planned from the start to
promote trade and migration.  The differing degrees of development of port facilities
were also a factor, but another key one was the greater interest in Toyama in overseas
trade.  While Kanazawa’s interest in Manchuria, stimulated by its expo and by the
events of the time, was short-lived, Toyama’s was deeper-rooted and ultimately far
more successful through the development of its ports and the relocation of such giant
factories as Nichi-Man Aluminium, the largest in the country, to take advantage of the
region’s cheap electricity and the imports of bauxite from Manchuria.  Toyama’s expo
shows a city much more confident in its future.  Rather than a desperate effort to
attract industry to slow the gradual decline of a once-powerful city, Toyama’s expo
was designed as a way to focus national attention not on the city’s need for industry
but rather on its potential to promote trade and imperialist ideals.  It was a celebration
of peacetime imperialism at its height.
Conclusion
By 1937, as Japanese soldiers were on their way to Nanjing, and Prime Minister
Konoe Fumimaro was saying “I believe that the Empire desires peace for East Asia,
and wish it to grow on a foundation of world peace based on bilateral cooperation
with China” 57) when he set forth the National Spiritual Mobilization Law, the rhetoric
of empire was giving way to that of war.  Kanazawa, whose industrial output was
based on peacetime industries, felt the brunt of wartime economic reorganizations
harshly.  China, a major market for its silk and cloth, was now cut off.  Even
Manchuria was now closed.58) Its failure to develop heavy industry and its reliance on
trade with the continent were two factors that meant that despite earlier hopes for
trade and glory, serious Imperialist expansion after the China War began had a
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perversely detrimental effect.  Local identities were increasingly tied in with overtly
nationalistic rhetoric, and while the local press gave detailed accounts of regional
responses to the war, the language used is devoid of any regional patriotism, and
simply parrots the same type of rhetoric used elsewhere: bland statements like “we
fully support the government decisions and while promising to prevent any
unravelling of civilian [duty] will work together for the unity of the nation” 59) that
could come from anywhere in the country.
While support for the Imperial polity was expressed in ever-more glowing terms,
there was no longer any suggestion of local gain.  Amid orders that the fall of Nanjing
was not to be celebrated with parties as it would “be inappropriate for civilians in a
time of war,” 60) such selfish ideas as local development were severed from the
Imperialistic discourse and left to find their own way.61) While Niigata’s trade share
with Manchuria increased dramatically during the Asia–Pacific War, it was only as the
major ports of the Pacific coast were being systematically destroyed by Allied
bombing and mine-laying campaigns.  The relatively safe Japan Sea offered just about
the only safe haven for importing vital raw supplies to the homeland, and it was not
enough.  Gradually isolated from her colonies, Japan was faced with the threat of mass
famine by the end of the war.  The Japan Sea Era’s brief period of hope for regional
prosperity was over.
Each trumpeting their suitability for development into a major trading port, the
various regions of the Hokuriku sought to attract industry and population, and thus to
shake off the stigma of “Ura-Nihon.”  The rhetoric was particularly clear in the former
million-koku castle town of Kanazawa, which phrased the ideals of the Japan Sea Era
in terms of a rebirth of its former glory.  A key factor in Kanazawa’s case was also the
use of the rhetoric of Imperialist glory to stimulate the populace, and turn them into
the type of citizen needed to create a modern industrial city, part of a modern
industrial nation.  This adaptation of national goals to further regional interests formed
a type of “Imperialist Regionalism” in which peripheral regions supported Imperialist
goals not solely through patriotic fervor but through pragmatic economic motives.
This on-going process illustrates the continued importance and reinvention of
regional identities in discourse and decision making at the local level, even in one of
the periods most associated with Japanese totalitarianism.  Regional attitudes along
the Japan Sea coast towards the empire and the colonies were at heart peaceful, built
as they were on the growth of maritime trade.  That this trade was only made possible
by the militaristic side of imperialism was an irony seemingly ignored by local
politicians and commentators, and there is no sense even in later examples of the
coming full-scale war that would ruin most of their dreams.  However, local identities
that were boosted and given hope by imperialism were ironically swamped by
nationalism as the war situation escalated.  Local imperialism was predicated on
peaceful expansion through trade, or at least heavy-handed coercion of the locals.  As
the military, which had a dim view of capitalism anyway, increased its hold over the
country, the discourses of local patriotism and support for the imperial endeavor were
easily and subtly transformed into the discourses of full-blown militaristic nationalism.
The effect of Imperialist endeavors on regional Japan was thus presented as a regional
goal, primarily to help lift the Japan Sea coast out of its long stagnation.  In the
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commercial air of the expos and trade ports, Imperialism was presented as largely
separate from pure militarism, a largely benign, rather paternalistic, duty that was also
an opportunity for a neglected region to share in the development of modern Japan.
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